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J. G. Patel, then Governor of the Central Bank of India, remarked in a lecture in 1980 that he could
see the attraction of "some form of collectivisation of agriculture, not so much because it is superior to a
capitalist form of agriculture in terms of efficiency of production, but because it offers...better  chances of
disguising unemployment in a socially acceptable form."  (The Economist, March 28,  1981, p. 47).
A parallel  observation is that one advantage of a capitalist structure of agriculture  is that it
disguises exploitation of farm owner-operators in a socially acceptable  form.  The exploitation  of course is
self-imposed,  resulting from two forms of reward:  An income as worker and manager, and a potential
increase in net worth.
If the laborer does not own the assets used in the job, all reward is confined to labor income.  Any
perception of well-being cannot include  an increase in net worth represented by the appreciating value  of
the means of production.  The worker cannot look forward to potential capital gains.  This is the sharpest
distinction to be made between a socialist  and a capitalist structure of agriculture.
This provides  a point of departure for a selective exploration of contrasts and convergence  in
socialist and capitalist agriculture.  The discussion will focus on the Soviet Union and the United States.
In geographic,  demographic and agricultural  dimensions they are more nearly alike than any two of the
world's other major economies.  Comparisons  can be made that among other countries might be invalid
due to differences in scale.
Great as the similarities  may be, the more intriguing questions concern  the differences.  The major
breaks with a capitalist tradition in the USSR involve space,  and time.  No rent  is charged for land, and
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Another major difference  is the absence  of firm-to-firm markets.  One of the shibboleths of socialism
has been the middleman or the marketeer, who buys, sells and profits from the labor of others.  To
eradicate this evil, the state and its agencies  are given monopsony power as the buyer of goods and
services.  Due to the spatial nature of agricultural production,  this inhibits the exploitation of
opportunities for regional specialization.
One consequence  is that the production unit in Soviet agriculture  attempts to remedy the absence of
farm-to-farm or firm-to-farm markets by creating a unit large enough to insure availability of key
production requirements.  The huge grain farms that have been the symbol of Soviet agriculture  are one
result.  An odd criterion of adequate  size is control of a park of tractors and machinery large enough to
insure that spare parts can be cannibalized from the farm's own equipment in periods of critical field
work.
The need to guarantee  supply of critical components is much greater in livestock production, leading
to managerial units that combine grain producing and livestock producing units.  A beef-feeding  enterprise,
for example, that must rely on official procurement for its feed supplies is at a great disadvantage  when
compared to one that produces its own feed.
A market economy  reduces this risk exposure through efficient farm-to-farm markets.  The feedlot
can buy feed  from farmers that produce grain only and feed no livestock.  If the transport system is
flexible, decentralized,  and efficient,  the feedlot manager has a wide range of choices in satisfying his
feed demands.  The division of labor that results enables the geographic separation of the three key parts
of the beef-producing system: cow-calf units using grazing lands, grain-producing  lands, and feedlot
operations.  Markets,  and transport, are the critical variables.
Attempts to increase the production of red meats, and especially beef, place a great strain on an
agricultural structure  that lacks farm-to-farm markets, and that suffers from inadequate transport.  These
shortcomings are much less serious in an agricultural economy producing primarily grains, or bulk
2commodities that are not processed on the farm.  This characterized  most of USSR agriculture until the
1970's.
The greater emphasis on meat production after  1970 in the USSR exposed the  difficulty of
organizing livestock feed supplies  in a command economy.  The problem is acute  in beef production since
the bulk of the supply of feeder cattle in the USSR still comes from the dairy sector.  A range cattle
industry based on beef-breeds is in its infancy in the Soviet Union.  Its development  is inhibited by the
unfavorable location  and quality of grazing lands, a lack of feeder cattle markets, and poor transport.
One result  is that feeder-cattle  production  is difficult to separate from the dairy sector.  The best
insurance against a shortage of feeder cattle or feed is to create a command structure that includes grain
and forage lands, proximity to a large dairy unit, and a feedlot.  This leads to an unwieldy management
unit, and forecloses  many economies of geographic specialization.  This is the current situation in many
regions of the USSR.
The problem  is less severe with pigs and poultry, primarily because their efficient production can be
achieved with little or no dependence on forages.  The feeds required are storable, and production centers
can be served by rail transport.  Replacement  pigs or chickens can be produced in proximity to the units
in which they will be fed to market weights.  The potentials  for spatial concentration  of the entire
production process from birth to slaughter are much greater than with beef cattle.
The root problem is that Soviet farm managers have few opportunities to decide to internalize  or
externalize  procurement and production activities.  It is safest to internalize, even at the sacrifice of
economies of specialization.  They are virtually precluded from opportunities to explore any economies of
diversity, and are compelled to confine themselves to economies of size.  As a result they provide the
world's best examples of diseconomies  of size in agriculture.
Recognition of this problem is possible only if managers have reliable information on real costs of
production.  Given the biological nature of agricultural production processes, it follows that time costs are
critical.  If the interest rate does not reflect the true opportunity cost of capital, then managers  are
3limited in their ability to make cost-minimizing  decisions.  This too is  of particular  importance in livestock
sectors, and especially in beef.
In efficient production units in the United States the time required from chick to finished broiler
averages  seven weeks; from piglet to fat hog takes on average six months; while the time-span from
newborn  calf to a slaughter-ready fat beef will average fourteen to eighteen months.  An intensively
managed chicken broiler producing unit can turn over the capital value of its flock five times in  a year,
and a hog producer  twice a year.  The capital involved in the comparable production cycle in fed beef will
at best be turned over only about twice in three years. It is clear that the absence of realistic interest
rates is a major handicap in organizing efficient beef production systems.  Without a price on time there
is no way to measure the costs or the rewards associated with variations in the time-cycle  of production.
A basic problem in the Soviet livestock  sector involves the maintenance  of a livestock inventory that
is excessively large in relation to the output of meat and milk.  The following charts illustrate the
magnitude of the problem, using comparative data for the USSR and the USA.  Figures 1 and 2 show the
trends since 1950 in the number of cattle and, among cattle, in the number of cows, using an inventory
date of January 1 for both countries.
Several features stand out.  The much greater year-to-year  variability in cattle numbers in the USA
is explained by the responsiveness  of producers to shifts in market prices, production costs and consumer
demand.  There is little evidence of a similar "cattle cycle" in the data for the USSR.  It is intriguing to
note that in the USSR on January  1, 1987 there were 430 head of cattle per thousand of the population,
and 410 per thousand in the USA.  In both absolute and per capita terms, the Soviet Union  has the larger
inventory.
The ratio of cows to total cattle numbers is more interesting.  In the USA in the 1980s the
proportion of cows to total cattle has averaged about 43 percent, and has been increasing.  In the USSR
the similar ratio has averaged about 36 percent and is falling.  This is one indication of the pervasive
tendency  to value the head-count  in Soviet livestock enterprises,  and to undervalue  the capital costs of
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8  Q~~~~~Figure  3 disaggregates  the cow inventory data for the USA into cows kept  for milk, and "other" or
beef cows.  Available data do not permit a similar breakdown for the USSR.  The remarkable  feature of
the transition  in dairying in the USA has been the reduction of the dairy cow herd from 24 million in
1950 to just over 10 million in the mid  1980s while actually increasing the total production of milk.
Higher milk yields per cow  released  breeding capacity and feed supplies that led immediately to increases
in the beef cow herd.  A least-squares  trend line fitted to the  increase in beef cow numbers after the
1950's would be a virtual mirror-image of the decreasing trend in dairy cow numbers.  One message is
clear.  Less  feed is required in the dairy sector to maintain dairy cow "frames", and more is available for
the production of milk.  Advances in milk yield per cow have released resources  for the expansion  of beef
production.
Just how significant  these increases in dairy cow productivity have been is shown in Figures 4 and 5.
Figure 4 shows total production of milk from cows in the USA and in the USSR, 1950 to 1986.  In terms
of total output, the Soviet Union has clearly exceeded the USA since the mid-1960's.  A precise
comparison  is made difficult by the fact that the US data are confined  to cow's milk, while for the Soviet
Union "Data on milk production include actual milked milk of cows, sheep, goats, mares, not depending  on
whether the milk is sold or a part of it  is used by the farm for feeding calves and piglets" (Narkhoz,
1972, pp. 780).  Although reliable  estimates of milk produced by type of animal are not available  for the
USSR, it is clear that the Soviet Union has made  substantial increases in total milk production for over
three decades.
A different picture is given in Figure 5, showing the trend in milk production per  cow for the  two
countries  since 1950.  Output per cow in the US rose almost without  interruption,  from 5,300 pounds in
1950 to 13,300  in 1986.  Productivity per cow also increased in the USSR but the productivity gap between
the US and the USSR has steadily widened.  In 1950, milk output of 3,020 pounds per cows in the USSR
was 57 percent of the level in the US.  In 1986, the USSR output per cow of 5,380 pounds was only 40
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^^<~t8  ^^^^^ These productivity differences  are repeated  in the output of beef and veal, although here the gap has
been slowly narrowing.  Figure 6 shows substantial year to year variation  in meat production from the
cattle herd, in both the US and the USSR.  Variability is especially marked in the US since  1972.  The
significance  of the trends shown in Figure 6 becomes clearer by referring back to Figures 1 and 2.  The
11 million metric tons of beef and veal produced in the US in 1985 came  from a cattle herd of
approximately  110 million head on January 1, 1985.  Beef and veal production in the USSR of 7.4 million
metric tons in  1985 came from a herd of 121 million head at the beginning of the year.  With 10 percent
more cattle in 1985 the USSR produced  only 67 percent as much beef and veal as the US.  This overstates
the production performance in the USSR, since the US data are in terms of carcass weight, excluding
offals, while the USSR data report slaughter weight, which differs slightly from carcass weight, and
includes fats and offals.
The major lesson from this series of charts  is that the USSR has been increasing cattle  numbers at
the expense of productivity.  Far too much feed is being used to maintain body weights leaving too little
available  for the production of milk and meat.  This problem is intensified by a deterioration in the feed
conversion coefficients in beef and milk production on state and collective farms and interfarm enterprises
for at least the past 15 years.  Table 1 shows these trends in the efficiency with which feed is used for
selected years since  1970.  The surprising fact is that a kilogram of beef produced  in the socialized
sectors in 1985 required 17 percent more feed than in 1970, and a kilogram of milk required 14 percent
more input.  Unfortunately, available  data preclude comparable  estimates of feeding efficiency in the
private sector.
Table  1.  USSR feed-conversion  coefficients  (kilogram of oat-unit equivalent/kilogram  of output)  for state
and collective farms and interfarm enterprises.
Product  1970  1980  1983  1984  1985
Beef  11.5  13.4  13.2  13.5  13.5
Milk  1.4  1.5  1.55  1.55  1.6
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12The obvious conclusion is that the Soviet Union possesses unutilized reserves  for the increase  of meat
and milk production without  producing  or importing additional grains.  This is  underlined by frequent
references in Soviet publications to protein deficiencies  in feed rations  and to shortages  of forage and
fodder crops.  The CPSU Central  Committee in December 1986 specifically singled out the tendency for
livestock managers  to compensate  for fodder shortages by feeding more grain (Pravda, Aug. 6, 1986).  At a
subsequent conference  of the CPSU Central Committee called  in January  1987 to deal explicitly with
agriculture,  Ye. K. Ligachev noted that "the Ukraine has changed from  a supplier  of grain for state
resources  to a consumer of grain" (Pravda, Jan. 25,  1987).
What explains this relative retardation  in agricultural technology, in a country that has mastered
space exploration?  No simple answer provides a satisfactory explanation.  One evident cause is the
existence  in planning circles of a motivation that Dyker calls "investment goods fetishism."  He concludes
that love of the gargantuan must be a large part of the explanation for decision to undertake  giant hydro-
electric projects or attempts at river diversions, even though they may be sharply opposed by Soviet
technical experts (Dyker, 1970, and Dyker, 1983,  p. 146).
The huge dairy farm or the mammoth livestock or poultry feeding enterprise  is the agricultural
equivalent of the big dam or steel mill.  Perhaps nowhere  in the world is the slogan  "big is better"
enshrined more  securely in economic policy than in the Soviet Union.  The consequences were apparent  in
the initial drive to mechanize grain farming.  They now emerge as a significant brake on the
rationalization of livestock production.  Livestock units are driven to internalize the supply of all critical
production inputs, especially feeds and young animals.  This creates units that are simply too big to be
managed efficiently.
In a narrow sense, the large livestock enterprise offers some economies of size.  The efficiency of
feed conversion in large concentrated Soviet poultry enterprises  is clearly better than in the more diffuse
production of beef or pork.  It is in a larger  sense of more rational land use that the inefficiency of the
large Soviet livestock  enterprise becomes apparent.  Some parts of the USSR are suited to grazing land
uses.  Other parts are best suited to grain production.  Still other parts can produce both forage and grain
13crops efficiently.  If a livestock enterprise  must internalize  its supply of feeders, feeds  and forages it
may achieve  some superficial efficiency in feed conversion  ratios, but at the expense  of regional efficiency
in land use.
The relevance of this unresolved problem is emphasized by a joint resolution  of the CPSU Central
Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of August 6,  1986, stressing the policy of "satisfying farms'
internal fodder-grain  needs primarily through internal production" (Pravda, Aug. 6,  1986).  The uneconomic
consequences  of attempting to create self-sufficient  livestock producing units in an economy that straddles
both the temperature  and the rainfall margins of crop cultivation should be apparent.  In the peculiar
conditions of farm management planning in the USSR, this may be the only feasible solution.  Feed mixing
can certainly be monitored more carefully in a big unit than in many small ones.  Lacking farm-to-farm
markets or good truck transport, a Soviet livestock manager may logically opt for a do-it-yourself solution
to the supply of feeds or young stock.  The USSR has a long military tradition of fostering regional self-
sufficiency.  The current trend in livestock producing units is a micro-version of what must be regarded as
fundamental  Soviet survival policy.
In addition to an agricultural version of "investment goods fetishism" there is another similarly
intangible reason for the Soviet emphasis on the "body count" in livestock farming.  In market economies
at early stages of development  livestock have traditionally served a function in the financial system.  First
as  a form of money, providing a relatively standardized unit of exchange and capable of adaptability in
velocity of circulation. Second,  as a substitute banking system, in that livestock can serve as a storehouse
of value, and ease the transition to a money economy.  Wealth in cattle country is measured in livestock.
Although this wealth is not private in the USSR, it is no less real.  The Soviet farm manager  can
effectively privatize  it by his ability to manipulate  administrative and party structures  to enable him to
exercise and retain control.
In 1975 the distinguished anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt proposed the creation of national
livestock banks to rationalize the economy of tribal pastoralists (Goldschmidt,  1975).  Although focused  on
Africa, this  has intriguing significance  for the Soviet Union.  Livestock do substitute for a banking
14system  when other forms of savings and investment  are precluded.  The Soviet stress on livestock numbers
is deeply embedded in the  total economic structure,  reflecting an unusable interest  rate and  a defective
system  of bank financing.  A more rational banking system  is essential for an improved Soviet livestock
sector, using a rate of interest that penalizes managers for holding capital in agriculture  too long.  Over-
aged livestock herds are the agricultural equivalent  of the unfinished  construction projects that infest
Soviet  cities.  The remedy is the same in both cases:  Charge realistic interest rates on underutilized
capital.
The development  of socialist agriculture  is not only hampered by the absence  of a functional price  on
time, it must also struggle with unpriced natural resources, of which land is the most critical example.
With no rent charged for land, a farm manager is compelled to externalize land costs.  The more serious
consequences arise at the regional or national level, since planning and policy-making bodies have no
quantitative measure of alternative costs when land use is involved.  In  a critique of Soviet investment
policy, Dyker points out that:
"The most long-suffering third party in cost-externalization  is agriculture....  More often, of
course, it is directly through the transfer of land out of agricultural use that agriculture is
affected...."  (Dyker, 1983 p. 47).
An unrealistic  interest rate and the absence of land rent guarantee that livestock and land are
effectively unpriced.  The importance  of this defect has accelerated in the last three decades, in both
industry and agriculture.  In capitalist market economies the decline of labor costs in industry is dramatic.
Peter Drucker, the doyen of U.S. management  consultants, recently observed that:
"If you're working on improving labor productivity you're wasting your time.  Very few
companies have more than 10%  labor costs."  (The Wall Street Journal, July 28,1987, p. 23).
The unremarked  corollary is that this same observation can be applied to modern agriculture.  Very
few capital-intensive farm enterprises have labor costs in capitalist economies that are above the  10-15%
range.  The potential for capital/labor substitution in agriculture  is nearing exhaustion.  This is slowly
being recognized in capitalist agriculture, but is no less significant  for the USSR.  Defects  in the pricing
15system for land and capital are compounded by an ideological stress on labor's contribution  in production.
At a time when capital costs are increasingly  dominant in agriculture, the Soviet Union is denying itself
the tools by which a rational calculation of capital's contribution to production can be made.
This failure to measure the significance  of accelerating capital intensity is paralleled in the USSR by
the difficulty in abandoning an emphasis on extensive  agriculture.  An unsettling shift in thinking is
involved in the transition from expansion of the cultivated area to an emphasis  on increased intensity of
land use.  The shift typically involves a time-span measured in generations.  This shift is well under way
in U.S. agriculture, but perception of its significance  is still impeded.  U.S. farmers and their advisers still
tend to think of farm  size in terms of acres.  A reduction in acre size associated with an increase in the
economic size of the farm business seems to be a contradiction  in terms.  This mode of thinking is slowly
changing in U.S. agriculture, and has only just begun to change  in the USSR.
One manifestation of the response to a need for change  is reflected in the tendency to construct new
facilities  rather than to modernize existing capacity.  This tendency is strong, in both the U.S. and the
USSR.  The reasons may be quite different--but they may have similar results.  In the U.S. the hope for
capital gains through appreciating real estate values is a powerful motivating force.  This is not relevant
in the USSR.
What drives the Soviet preference  for new capacity instead of the intensification of existing capacity?
One plausible answer is that the rent-seeking  drive of Soviet planners and bureaucrats  is a substitute form
of the search for capital gains.  Denied rewards through increased real estate values, Soviet officials and
managers who opt for new facilities may be using the only channel open to them to benefit from the
increase in value of the national stock of land and structures.  The gain comes from enhanced managerial
responsibility and the ability to appropriate a portion of the power  and prestige that comes from building
something new.  They can receive rent, not in money, but in jobs and status.
The USSR has created property rights in jobs on a vast scale, supplanting conventional  property
rights in tangible property.  This system gives "rent seeking" top priority, by default.  There is no other
rent to seek, except the rent from bureaucratic jobs. This puts the reform proposals of Gorbachev in a
16different light.  He is proposing  a "land reform" in the only way it could be proposed in the USSR,  i.e. by
expropriating some  of the property rights in jobs held by entrenched bureaucrats.  This is as threatening
in the USSR as a proposal to expropriate landed property held by an elite would be in a more capitalistic
economy.
A threat to "expropriate the rent seekers"  is also implied in the growing pressure  in the USSR to
permit firms to fail.  Bankruptcy is a sophisticated capitalistic concept.  It is closely related to accounting
practices that rely upon a rate of interest in determining present values of income streams, and relative
rates of return on investments.  The extension of the concept of bankruptcy to agriculture is an indicator
of the degree to which agriculture has entered the money economy.  This leads to some crucial questions:
Can socialist farms fail?  What are the measures of failure?  What are the social costs of failure?
The fact that it was not possible  to raise these questions until quite recently has been one measure
of the difference between socialist and capitalist approaches to the organization of agriculture.  If
socialist farms can fail, and if there is general agreement on the indicators of failure, then this is one
measure of the extent to which socialist and capitalist agricultural systems are converging.
The absence of any charges  for land rent plays a major role in explaining why is has been difficult
for socialist systems of agriculture  to acknowledge  failure.  To appreciate this it is important  to
understand that land values provide  a shock-absorbing  function,  as well as a source of capital gain.
An agricultural system that includes the prospect that the farm  operator can become a land owner
creates a powerful work incentive when land values are rising. When land values  fall, asset values are
wiped out but the cost is a private cost.  The capitalist farm can fail at a low social cost.  The effect of
an exhaustion of economic rent is to impoverish land owners, but there is no direct effect on public sector
revenues.  There may of course be severe indirect effects through declining tax revenue and rising welfare
costs.
A reduction of economic rent in a socialist system comes at the expense of state revenues.  The
state has been receiving economic rent, usually through manipulation of commodity prices paid producers,
and any reduction is felt directly by the state.  This is one reason why it  is difficult  in socialist
17economies for the state  to acknowledge  economic failure  or bankruptcy.  If the state guarantees jobs, then
the cost of failure  must be paid directly by the state.
If the cause  of failure is bad management,  and the state is the ultimate manager, then admission of
failure is unmistakable evidence of incompetence  in the public sector.  The state may be unwilling to
acknowledge  this political cost of failure.
Inability to rely on falling land values as an indicator of economic imbalance thus deprives the
socialist state of the shock absorbing capacity represented by a decline  in private sector asset values in a
market economy.  The typical reaction to economic adversity in a socialist system is to deny that it exists,
postpone recognition of any need for change, and prop up declining enterprises or sectors.  Both the
economic and the political  costs of admitting failure appear to be too high. As a result, there is a strong
motivation to resist change.
This analysis of some of the differences  between the structure of agriculture in the US and the USSR
can validly be presented in the present tense.  These differences  still persist.  But what can be said about
the future?  There are clear signs that key Soviet leaders are aware of the limitations imposed by the use
of unrealistic interest rates, the failure to price land, and the absence of firm-to-firm markets.  Resolution
of any one of these problems will disturb ideological commitments that are fundamental to the Soviet
system.  This insures that any reform will be a long and contested  affair.  The rather surprising  evidence
is that the issues are now being raised at the highest levels of the Soviet command structure.
Recent  proposals to permit firm-to-firm  contracts have focused primarily on the industrial sector.
The "Law on State Enterprises" enacted by the Supreme Soviet on June 30, 1987 explicitly states that
factories will be able to buy some supplies  directly from each  other, by-passing state procurement agencies
(Pravda, July 1, 1987, pp. 1-4).  The significance  of this change could be especially great in the livestock
sector.  The development of farm-to-farm  markets is probably the single most important step that could be
taken to promote a rational use of total feed supplies and to reduce Soviet dependence on imported grains.
A similar step is implied in the recent proposals to introduce reforms in the banking structure (The
Economist, July 4, 1987, p. 46).  It is unclear that this will include the introduction  of more realistic
18interest rates, but it is difficult to see how any significant banking reform  can avoid this step.  Here
again, the agricultural  impact of interest  rate reform will be most profound in the livestock  sector.
The realistic  pricing of land will generate the most severe ideological conflicts.  The most likely
route will be through expansion  of the current practice of contracting with farm production brigades.
Responsibility for a specific assignment of land, equipment, and livestock, and an obligation to deliver a
part of the output to the parent collective  or state farm, will approximate  a lease.  If the contracted
amount is specified  in quantities of product,  the arrangement will resemble a cash lease,  with all risk
borne by the tenants.  If the contract provides for delivery of a proportion of the crop or product, it
will resemble a share lease, with risk spreading between the contracting brigade and the parent farm.
In either case, negotiations  over the delivery amount will involve an implicit rent for the use of
resources, and especially land.  This seems to be the most likely route by which realistic charges for land
use will be introduced into the Soviet agricultural system.
In a remarkable review of the need for reform in the Soviet income tax system.  S.  Shatalin and V.
Grebennikov  recently proposed that:
"...tax rates for income from personal auxiliary farm plots must take into account the current
food situation and ensure  an interest in the sale of surplus output from such plots on the side.  It may be
necessary to allow individual producers to retain some part of the rent income" (Ekonomicheskava  Gazeta,
No. 42, October  1986, p. 4).
The appearance  of proposals of this nature in a national journal is no guarantee of action.  It does
underline the change that has taken place in Soviet discussion of sensitive issues.  Speaking of her own
work, the sociologist T. I. Zaslavskaya recently defended her argument for higher meat and milk prices by
pointing out that:
'The possibility of an open discussion in the press of complex problems of the country's
economic and social development  in itself stimulates creative work.  A few year ago,  it would simply have
been impossible for my latest articles to appear" ("The Personality of a Scholar and Restructuring,"
Argumentv  i Fakty, March 21-27, 1987, p.1).
19In reviewing the prospects for  Soviet agriculture in the  1980s, Johnson argued that "until labor is
adequately rewarded  most other changes will have little effect" (Johnson and Brooks, 1983,  p.  113).  The
thesis of this paper  is that the route to a more adequate reward system  for labor lies through the realistic
pricing of agricultural capital and land.  The possibility of progress on this front is one of the most
intriguing promises of the Gorbachev era.
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